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Abstract 
 
Vladimir Putin has been at the helm of the Russian state since 2000, with much of the post-
2008 period in Russia being characterised by poor economic performance. At the same time, 
many issues concerning regional development and public service provision have gone 
unaddressed. Yet, despite all these problems—which polls suggest do not go unnoticed by the 
Russian people—the popularity of the most powerful man in government has not slipped far 
from all-time highs. This paper suggests an evolutionary psychological explanation for 
Putin's resilient popularity and examines it through the question of whether the thematic 
content of Putin’s rhetoric matches theoretical expectations stemming from evolutionary 
psychology. Using a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods to analyse a corpus of 
annual addresses by Vladimir Putin, it suggests that the thematic content of Putin's rhetoric is 
consistent with what a cultural reinterpretation of Hamilton’s rule from evolutionary 
psychology predicts is particularly potent with followers. Specifically, his rhetoric creates 
bonds of relatedness within a defined group and focuses on benefits affecting members of 
that group—exactly what a cultural Hamilton's rule view of human social behaviour would 
suggest. The paper then links this explanation to Putin’s approval ratings by looking at how 
this thematic content varies over time. In doing so, the paper represents a step towards an 
evolutionary psychological view of leadership appeal in modern political communities. 
 
‘No doubt there will be more recognition of the dependence of many political phenomena on 
the relatively sudden emergence of ‘civilization’ from the largely anonymous sea of tribal or 
folk societies… man had operated in small bands or tribes for at least half a million years 
and that he has had a relatively short time in which to master the civilization that is his own 
invention.’ 
Harold Laswell, The Future of the Comparative Method, 1968  
  
I. Introduction 
 2018 marks the start of Vladimir Putin’s fourth presidential term. Ever since the global 
recession and the advent of Western sanctions over Russia’s activities in Ukraine, Russia has 
been experiencing economic difficulty (Movchan, 2017). The price of oil, Russia’s major 
export, crashed in 2014, dragging with it the nation’s currency and, subsequently, raising 
inflation. When one combines this with the last decade’s economic contraction and the 
persistence of numerous social-policy problems, one starts appreciating that the situation in 
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the country is far from socio-economically ideal (Hille, 2018). According to public opinion 
surveys (Levada Centre, 2018), this fact is not strange to the Russian public: economic and 
political optimism fell each year from 2012-2015, and perceptions of material wellbeing fell 
annually between 2014-2017. Citizens also reported decreasing quality of healthcare 
provision each year since 2005.  
 
Yet, amongst this negativity, Putin’s personal ratings remain stable at 80%. Having been at 
Russia’s helm since 2000, Putin is widely acknowledged as a powerful leader who retains 
primary influence over all major areas of Russian policy (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). When 
it comes to giving credit for Russia’s successes, an overwhelming majority assigns it to none 
other than Putin. Meanwhile, the broader government seems to suffer the blame for persistent 
problems, with the number of citizens supporting the current ministerial Government’s 
resignation having risen every year since 2012. The question that needs to be answered, 
therefore, is why citizens report increasing dissatisfaction with their lives and the broader 
government, yet appraisals of the country’s leader remain high. 
 
This paper aims to partially solve this puzzle by exploring the psychological basis of the 
support for Putin. It takes the support for him as given and suggests an evolutionary 
psychological (EP) explanation for it. Specifically, this paper posits that Putin’s rhetoric may 
trigger psychological mechanisms in subjects that have evolved over millions of years. To 
define what makes political leaders popular, this paper develops a model based on a re-
interpretation of Hamilton’s rule (1964) to include cultural relatedness and Haslam, Reicher, 
and Platow’s ‘New Psychology of Leadership’ (NPL) (2011).  
 
To test this model, the paper asks whether the thematic content of Putin’s rhetoric is 
consistent with the model’s theoretical predictions. It does so by analysing annual addresses 
by Putin since 2012, focusing on identifying change around junctures when Putin’s ratings 
spiked. This question represents the first of many that need to be asked to discern whether EP 
can really shed light on modern political leadership. 
 
The importance of this task is manifold. Firstly, it enables us to comprehend assertions that 
Putin’s popularity derives from the Kremlin’s control over the media (Enkilopov et al, 2010). 
After all, the media is just the means of transmission, and it remains necessary to explain why 
what is being transmitted is effective.  
 
Secondly, locating the root of Putin’s support in general psychological theories is important if 
one wants to avoid the argument that it stems from a fixation with authoritarianism somehow 
endemic to East-Slavic culture; it is this argument that makes drawing parallels between 
Putin’s case and the support for past Communist and Tsarist leaders so very common. 
Interpreting Putin’s popularity through an EP lens will aid understanding of what Putin and 
his followers share with others throughout history, thereby illuminating other cases of leader 
popularity.  
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As such, the paper’s ultimate hope is that the results of such psychological discussions will 
prove generalisable and offer interpretations for other instances of deviations from economic 
voting, such as recent anti-globalisation votes in the UK and the US. If psychological 
evolution has indeed led to people thinking in a certain way, then voter choice across 
historical contexts may be influenced by similar thought processes originating from 
humanity’s earliest days.  
 
The paper first reviews the literature on Putin’s popularity, political leadership, and 
evolutionary political psychology, before developing a Hamiltonian-NPL model and relating 
it to Putin. This model steers the two-pronged textual analysis that follows. Quantitative text 
analysis thematically and dynamically decomposes Putin’s rhetoric in the years 2012-2018, 
with these themes subsequently being contextualised and linked to our theoretical framework 
using discourse analysis. Together these approaches reveal whether Putin’s rhetoric matches 
the Hamiltonian-NPL model’s predictions of an appealing political leader, thereby shedding 
light on the relevance of EP to political popularity. 
 
I.I Literature Review 
 
This paper rests on several literatures, including the political science literature on Putin and 
the psychological and EP literature relating to politics and leadership. 
 
Due to the track record of authoritarian states, it is crucial to evaluate the trustworthiness of 
public opinion data. Frye et al (2017) use list experiments to demonstrate that Putin’s high 
approval ratings are almost certainly genuine, whilst Volkov (2015) discusses how viewing 
trends in approval and other Levada measures over Putin’s entire tenure suggests these 
ratings are not fabricated or the result of intimidation. Ratings of other senior government 
officials also tend to experience sharp falls, showing that the public does not hesitate to judge 
harshly (Bershidsky, 2017). Colton and Hale (2017) corroborate this, demonstrating that 
Putin’s support is broad-based and cannot be explained by fraud, oil prices, or coercion.  All 
this indicates that there exists a real issue for this paper to grapple with.  
 
As has been alluded, the growth of the Russian economy meaning presidential popularity up 
until this decade may well have been an instance of ‘the economy, stupid’ (Treisman, 2011). 
During 2011, however, Putin’s approval ratings dipped from 80% and stabilised at 60%, even 
though public economic perceptions remained constant. This was possibly because sections 
of the public ceased giving Putin the benefit of the doubt over persistent problems (Triesman, 
2014).  However, following 2014, the ratings shot up from around 60% and stabilised at 
80%
1
, despite the economy deteriorating and most these problems not having been solved. 
Hence, the question of what buttresses Putin’s support as he enters his third decade as leader 
arises.  
 
                                                 
1
 Figure 3 p.21. 
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Robertson and Greene (2017) argue that Putin’s support results from popular appeal, in an 
argument that resembles Hannah Arendt’s analysis of totalitarianism (1951), which viewed 
totalitarianism as created by the masses themselves. Rather than attributing Putin’s popularity 
solely to top-down authoritarian influences, Robertson and Greene identify the Russian 
citizen as a participant of regime renewal in Russia, telling a story of ‘co-construction’ in 
which state and society willingly interact to enshrine the regime.  
 
An illustration of Putin’s popularity would be incomplete without discussing his media 
images. Gessen (2012) describes the process through which the Russian regime monopolised 
the media, with other studies emphasizing that positive press in state media has contributed to 
Putin’s ‘personality cult’ and ‘celebrity status’ (Goscillo, 2013). Mikhailova (2013), for 
instance, notes Putin’s frequent media appearances with children as an attempt to portray 
Putin as a ‘fatherly figure’. 
 
The classical literature on authority offers a starting point to understanding the above 
acceptance. Weber (2004/1919) presents a typology of authority suggesting that followers 
accept rulers if the latter convey charismatic, traditional, or legal authority. The charismatic 
view suggests leaders are followed because they are ‘believed in’: leaders’ strength of 
personality in public appearances develops a ‘personal devotion’ and ‘trust in the heroism, or 
other leadership qualities of an individual’. Traditional authority, on the other hand, 
originates from custom, whilst legal authority stems from constitutional rules. Without 
discounting traditional and legal authority, this paper seeks to elucidate the mechanisms 
behind charismatic authority.  
 
To this end, Michels (1999/1911) argues that the masses are ‘delighted’ to succumb to 
leaders considered able to look past competing interests and ‘look after (peoples’) affairs’, 
pointing out that the masses’ gratitude often results in ‘adoration’ and ‘perpetual’ leadership, 
this being potentially applicable to Putin given his tenure’s length.  Burns (1979) separates 
these two approaches into two leadership types: ‘transformational’ leaders who 
charismatically create new leader-follower relationships, and ‘transactional’ leaders who are 
followed because they perform a service. This paper does not view Burns’ two typologies as 
mutually exclusive: in fact, it suggests that charisma may emerge through the communication 
of ‘transactional’ benefit. 
 
The case of Putin’s popularity has attracted diverse explanations. Some of the psychological 
literature cites an intrinsic ‘Slavic authoritarianism’ that has made autocratic figures 
venerated and desired in Russia across historical periods (Korneeva, 2011). However, such 
approaches are problematic due to a lack of generalisability and because of their vulnerability 
at junctures when historically authoritarian societies democratise.   
 
Newer psychological interpretations have been based on personality. Greene and Robertson 
(2017) explain political sentiment in Russia today by using the ‘Big Five’ personality traits 
from Goldberg (1983), namely, openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and 
neuroticism. One of their findings is that citizens’ ‘agreeableness’ plays a large role in 
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predicting regime support: the fear of disrupting societal consensus that is associated with 
this trait results in the resilience of traditional values and leaders.  
 
It is this ‘agreeableness’ trait that brings us to EP as a promising explanatory model. This is 
because ‘agreeableness’ could be an evolutionary result of the success of cohesive groups 
(Boyd and Richerson, 1985). A corollary of the success of cohesive groups is a recognition 
by members that cohesive communities are beneficial, implying that leaders communicating 
notions of unity would fall on favourable ears. Furthermore, ‘agreeable’ people who fear 
detachment from the community will rally behind a leader perceived as beneficial for the 
group’s interests (Spisak et al, 2015). Thus, exploitation of intrinsic traits may help leaders 
gain followers—a view that can be traced to Machiavelli (2003/1532).  
 
Graham Wallas (1929) was among the first to attack political science as only studying ‘the 
thing done’ and not those ‘doing it’, pointing to evolutionary biology as a way forward. EP 
has been establishing itself in politics since de Waal’s observations of political behaviour in 
chimpanzees (1982). Schubert (1989) and Blanc et al (2014) discuss how insights from 
evolution relate to politics, arguing that some of the work in this direction represents a 
naturalistic paradigm shift.  Petersen (2016) summarises the current state of the art, noting its 
fundamental insight that people make socio-political decisions using primeval rules revolving 
around the overarching aim of gene propagation (Dawkins, 1989). This principle of kin-
selection can lead to ethnocentrism and other forms of in-group/out-group tension (van de 
Berghe, 1987) that politicians exploit. Another EP insight are evolved cognitive biases such 
as loss-aversion, which makes fear-evoking political rhetoric particularly effective 
(Arceneaux, 2012). 
 
Yet another result is that people may have evolved to prefer strong leaders at the expense of 
personal freedoms (Sidanius and Gurzban, 2003). This is particularly the case in groups that 
experience frequent inter-group conflict (van Vugt, 2007)—a criterion most certainly 
applicable to Russia considering the many wars it has waged throughout history. Strength is 
something leaders convey through appearance—which may explain Putin’s shirtless videos 
(RT, 2017)—as well as actions and words (van Vugt, 2006). Shestopal (2012) notes strength 
as a key component of Putin’s public appraisals. 
 
EP leadership models can point us to what rhetorical content would be appealing.  Boehm 
(1999), for instance, writes that in hunter-gatherer societies leaders emerge temporarily as 
figures perceived to possess decisiveness and competence: a focus on issue resolution would 
thus help gain popularity.  
 
Van Vugt and Rooby (2014; 2008) note that leadership selection tends to be bottom-up, with 
hunter-gatherers disliking despots. This would predict that popular leaders possess humility 
and aim to convey to people that it is the latter who have the power of choice.  
 
Finally, kin selection, a concept going back to Darwin whereby natural selection rewarded 
species where relatives helped each other survive, predicts that leaders will emphasize the 
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interests of a defined in-group. The concept is simply expressed in Hamilton’s rule of social 
behaviour (1964), which argues that the promotion of in-group interests underpins many 
social species’ behaviours. Scholars have recently started emphasising its relevance to the 
evolution of political institutions and cultures, with group-relatedness being extended beyond 
genetic relatedness to include cultural relatedness (Birch, 2017). Section I.II offers an 
application that can be tested through looking at verbal communication.     
       
I.II. Theoretical Model 
 
This paper theorises that since people have evolved to follow Hamilton’s rule of social 
behaviour, leaders gain popularity if their selection as leaders is seen by followers to 
maximize this rule. The simplest version of Hamilton’s rule is the following: 
 
rB > C 
 
in which r is the coefficient of relatedness to the agent following this rule of another 
individual (or group), B is the evolutionary (survival/reproduction/comfort) benefit of an 
agent’s action to that related individual (or group), and C is the cost of the action to the agent. 
If this inequality holds, the agent’s decision will be seen by the agent to benefit those within 
the agent’s kinship group, with this benefit increasing in proportion to perceived relatedness. 
Importantly in the context of modern political societies, this paper sees r as encompassing 
both genetic and perceived cultural relatedness. 
 
When it comes to selecting leaders, agents will select leaders they judge to be most beneficial 
to their groups’ interests. To attract support, leaders may therefore define a kinship group to 
raise the relatedness co-efficient r and behave/speak in ways seen to promote group interests 
B. Voting for someone like Putin may well incur costs on voters, but they will still do so if 
the perceived benefits to their community are large enough. 
 
The relevance of this Hamiltonian logic to leadership appeal can be seen in Haslam, Reicher 
and Platow’s (2011) ‘New Psychology of Leadership’ (NPL). The main principle of NPL is 
that effective leadership derives from the leader’s ability to ‘embody and promote a 
psychology that they share with others.’ NPL therefore helps us look at which aspects of 
Putin’s rhetoric are consistent with this paper’s assumptions regarding what citizens find 
appealing. 
 
Elements of NPL help us describe what sort of leader the cultural Hamilton rule would 
encourage individuals to follow: 
a) Successful leaders champion in-group interests. Leaders become appealing when 
they are working for the collective interest of the group they are appealing to. In 
Hamiltonian terms, this benefits the survival of the group, raising rB. 
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b) Appealing leaders construct identity. This suggests that popular leaders actively 
create narratives placing their audience into groups. Such strategies attempt to 
artificially increase r—something that social structures and modes of communication 
absent from the ancestral environment made possible through an evolutionary 
‘mismatch’ (cultural evolution overtaking biological evolution) (van Vugt et al, 
2008). 
 
Hamilton’s rule thus describes voter logic; NPL, meanwhile, describes appealing leaders. 
This paper refers to these theories’ sum as the ‘Hamiltonian-NPL’ model, which describes 
how leaders act upon follower logic to increase their popularity. The insights of the combined 
Hamiltonian-NPL model inform our theoretical expectations regarding Putin’s rhetoric. To 
raise r, one would expect Putin to talk about nationhood, patriotism, and historical instances 
when people united to overcome a difficulty (e.g. successful wars). Identity-building through 
talking about culture could serve the same purpose: such themes reinforce notions of a 
culturally and historically related ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983). Raising r could 
also be attempted from the other direction: for example, Putin may focus on defining the 
‘other’, i.e. an external community like the ‘West’, or an antagonist on the global scene. This 
would be consistent with the view that ‘otherisation’ tightens and encloses in-group bonds 
(Taylor, 2009). 
 
To raise perceived B, one would expect Putin to acknowledge the problems Russians face. 
This could be done through themes centred around the economy, social development, 
security, and grand strategy, as these issues either directly contribute to citizen welfare or 
raise the perceived status of one’s community through feelings like pride. 
 
These expectations can be falsified in many ways. On a quantitative level, this paper’s 
hypothesis that rB-raising rhetoric is linked to popularity would predict that such rhetoric 
rises when popularity rises (i.e. would have risen after 2014). Whilst both rising 
simultaneously would not prove causation, one falling when the other rises would falsify our 
predictions.  Additionally, themes that directly attempt to raise r and B forming only a 
quantitatively small part of the thematic content of Putin’s speeches would weaken our 
model’s importance. On a qualitative level, this paper’s claims regarding the Hamiltonian 
implications of certain quotes can be questioned. 
 
II. Methodology 
 
This paper evaluates the merits of the Hamiltonian-NPL model through considering whether 
Putin’s communication with Russia’s citizens is consistent with the model’s predictions 
regarding rhetorical content. 
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II.I. Corpus Selection 
To do this, the paper analyses a set of addresses from Putin’s last presidential term (2012-
2018). The selected addresses are of different types but share common features: all are 
annual, all shown by state television, all addressed to citizens, and all widely viewed.
2
 This 
set includes Putin’s annual addresses to the Federal Assembly, in which Putin discusses the 
state of the nation; Putin’s 9th May addresses opening the annual military parade 
commemorating Russia’s victory in the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945), a focal point of 
Russian national identity (Torbakov, 2011); Putin’s annual New Year’s Eve addresses, 
uttered in the last minutes of each year; and transcripts of the annual Direct Line 
teleconference, in which Putin responds to selected citizens’ questions on topics ranging from 
the economy to Putin’s personal habits.3 The questions that end up being aired to Putin are 
pre-selected from millions of submissions by the Kremlin’s press-service. 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of Each Address Type 
Category of Address Tag Average length 
(minutes/words) 
Federal Assembly 
addresses 
FA 79 minutes/8,105 words 
Victory Day parade 
opening 
VD 7 minutes/501 words 
New Year’s Eve addresses NY 3 minutes/ 330 words 
Direct Line teleconference DL 245 minutes/16,979 words 
 
This makes for a total of 23 analysed speeches, in which Putin uttered circa 140,000 words. 
Both the original Russian and English-translated versions (official translations from the 
Kremlin website) were analysed as separate corpuses. The English-language results are the 
ones discussed in the main text because of issues to do with how the respective languages are 
processed by the software, which are discussed below.
4
 
 
The reasons for this sampling are numerous. Firstly, the speeches are particularly well-
viewed, suggesting they are a primary means of Putin’s communication with his subjects. 
Secondly, the fact that they are annual makes it possible to conduct dynamic analysis, which 
is important for understanding the post-Crimea popularity spike. Thirdly, their varied nature 
means that using them collectively will enhance the sample’s representativeness.  
 
                                                 
2
 DL2017 was watched live by over 6 million viewers across 3 state TV channels and received over 2 million 
questions for Putin (Focht, 2017). 
3
 See Appendices A and B. 
4
 See Appendix D. 
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II.II. Research Design 
Understanding rhetoric is complicated. When it comes to its overall psychological potency, 
its content is just one important component: for a fuller view, one must look at the content’s 
meaning within the context of the audience’s socio-political experiences. This paper therefore 
utilises a mixed-method approach: quantitative to discern content, and qualitative to interpret 
this content’s potency thematically and contextually. Thus, the paper espouses Grimmer’s 
and Stewart’s (2013) second principle of quantitative text analysis, stating that computerised 
methods ‘only augment humans, and do not replace them.’ An illustrative rationale in our 
corpus stems from the disproportional influence the shorter speeches may have on collective 
perception—something a purely quantitative method would obscure. 
 
First, the paper utilised the Thematic Analysis of Elementary Contexts function of T-Lab 
2017, a quantitative text analysis package, to identify thematic clusters within Putin’s 
rhetoric. Before inputting the corpus into T-Lab, all text not uttered by Putin was manually 
removed from the transcripts, which is particularly important with the Direct Line addresses 
due to their ‘Q&A’ format. The individual transcripts were then tagged by year and type.  
To pre-process texts, T-Lab automatically lemmatizes them (retains the base form of words, 
as their endings may vary) and removes stop words (‘empty’ words that do not convey 
specific and/or significant content on their own). The researcher then selects a unit of analysis 
(the elementary context unit (ECU)). Here, the choice was made to use ‘chunks’: word 
sequences less than 400 characters interrupted by full stop and carriage return. This was 
deemed the best unit of analysis among the smaller sentence and the larger paragraph units, 
due to this paper’s corpus including both short and long texts. T-Lab then creates a matrix of 
these ECUs and commonly occurring words, populated by the presence/absence values of 
these words. This is subsequently normalised to be workable, with rows scaled to unit length 
(Euclidean norm). 
 
For the Russian analysis, the list of stop-words and multi-words in the T-Lab dictionary had 
to be extensively manually updated following the initial run. This suggests that T-Lab’s 
dictionary for pre-processing Russian is less well maintained, meaning the automatic results 
contain frequent words that bear little thematic meaning, affecting the output’s 
informativeness. Once T-Lab’s dictionary was supplemented, however, the results of the 
analysis revealed the two language versions to be thematically alike. Seeing as unassisted 
reading of both versions reveals the English to be a direct translation, these thematically 
similar results demonstrate the software’s reliability when it comes to clustering. 
Nevertheless, the relatively incomplete stop-word list and inefficient lemmatization
5
 (seen 
when related words appear several times) in Russian suggests that, for the time-being, T-Lab 
is better equipped to deal with English texts. 
 
T-Lab then conducted the clustering process unsupervised by applying the bisecting K-means 
algorithm. Intuitively, this algorithm places the ECUs into different groups (clusters) by their 
mathematical (cosine-coefficient) similarity. The maximum number of possible clusters was 
                                                 
5
 See Table 3 p.14. 
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initially selected to be 10, to be adjusted upwards only if 10 clusters were produced after the 
first analysis. If fewer than 10 were produced, the researcher would need to decide which 
partition of the ones produced makes most analytical sense.  
 
Once the software produces these clusters, it is up to the researcher to assign thematic values. 
To enable this, T-Lab produces a list of commonly-occurring words in each cluster ranked by 
chi-squared value, which the researcher then interprets by evaluating meanings and possible 
connections between them. However, this process is subjective and inevitably influenced by 
researcher expectations. To reduce interpretive bias, this paper independently uses two people 
for this: its author and a person from an unrelated field to Russian politics (pharmacology).  
The proportional weighting of these thematic clusters was then computed for each year to 
enable analysis over time in relation to approval ratings. 
 
Making sense of these thematic clusters requires viewing them within their historical context, 
and so the quantitative methods were supplemented with qualitative analysis based on the 
Discourse Historical Approach (DHA). As an approach seeing ‘discourse as a form of social 
practice creating a situation, social identities, and relationships between people’ (Klymenko, 
2015), DHA is uniquely suitable to understanding how Putin’s rhetoric raises r and B. The 
original transcripts were used for this, thereby reducing the paper’s reliance on the T-Lab 
algorithm. 
 
To consider these contextual mechanisms, the paper explores how each identified theme falls 
into historically-embedded discourses. It then looks at how these discourses relate to issues of 
group identity and collective interest, thereby linking them to Hamiltonian calculus.  
 
III. Results and Discussion 
III.I. Theme Identification 
To shed light on the corpus, Tables 2 and 3 below show the overall statistics of the English 
and Russian-language corpuses respectively after initial T-Lab processing. The much higher 
unique word/lemma ratio and the larger proportion of unique words remaining out of total 
wordcount in the Russian corpus demonstrate T-Lab’s potentially reduced ability to process 
Russian.   
 
Table 2: Overall Corpus Statistics After Analysis (English) 
Total word count 163,935 
Unique words  9,500 
Lemmas 7,253 
Lemmatisation ratio 1.31 
Number of documents 23 
Total contexts (ECUs) after segmentation 3,441 
ECUs classified into clusters 3,297 
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Table 3: Overall Corpus Statistics After Analysis (Russian) 
Total word count 138,507 
Unique words  19,980 
Lemmas 19,886 
Lemmatisation ratio 1.00 
Number of documents 23 
Total contexts (ECUs) after segmentation 3,324 
ECUs classified into clusters 3,243 
Percentage of text classified 97.59% 
 
The results of the clustering analysis itself and the qualitative assessment of the clusters’ 
thematic content are shown in Table 4 below. As mentioned, the maximum number of 
clusters T-Lab could find was set at 10. The actual analysis yielded nine possible partitions. 
Upon trying every possible one, seven partitions were selected as subsequent partitions failed 
to yield sufficiently thematically distinct clusters. It is worth mentioning that T-Lab looks for 
general categorisation that can cover the entire corpus, and as such will not necessarily output 
every partition existing at document level. Excess reliance on T-Lab therefore risks omission.  
 
 Table 4: T-Lab Thematic Clusters 
Cluster 
(weight 
in overall 
corpus.    
n = 
3,441) 
Thematic Labels Top 16 Characteristic Words (Lemmas)  
by Chi-Squared Values 
1 
(15.44%) 
 
Law and government 
(Second interpreter: 
government/internal 
affairs) 
 
government; agency; federal; law; ask; regional; 
enforcement; authority; money; ministry; fund; 
budget; office; prosecutor; region; tax 
2 
(9.77%) 
Foreign policy 
(Second interpreter: 
international 
relations/politics) 
Ukraine; political; relation; election; partner; 
agreement; country; union; respect; integration; 
Ukrainian; dialogue; neighbour; United_States; 
party; sign 
3 
(12.91%) 
Economy 
(Second interpreter: 
finance/economy) 
percent; rate; increase; sector; growth; industry; 
inflation; economy; agricultural; GDP; 
agriculture; export; grow; average; figure 
Percentage of text classified 95.84% 
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4 
(19.39%) 
War and patriotism 
(Second interpreter: 
patriotism/nationalism) 
war; victory; happy; fight; patriotic; army; love; 
veteran; 
 great; wish; soldier; arm; enemy; hero; officer; 
nazism 
5 
(12.38%) 
Science and education 
(Second interpreter: 
education) 
education; research; child; university; student; 
professional; train; school; centre; programme; 
project; work; young; need; science; medical 
6 
(14.80%) 
Economic policies 
(Second interpreter: 
internal financial policy) 
problem; price; raise; exchange_rate; bank; 
billion; situation; central; loan; pension; resolve; 
issue; oil; rubles; cost; try 
7 
(11.16%) 
Defence and nationhood 
(Second interpreter: war) 
missile; Russia; weapon; world; nuclear; strategic; 
global; defence; challenge; international; century; 
treaty; unity; country; common; nation 
Sum: 
95.84% 
  
 
T-Lab automatically calculates the percentage of classified ECUs falling into each cluster. 
However, since this paper is interested in the weight of each theme in the entire corpus, the 
weightings were manually recalculated as a percentage of all ECUs, classified or unclassified. 
They can be seen in the first column. Since the thematic labels were assigned by the 
researcher, readers can judge them by observing the list of characteristic words in the third 
column. At this point, it is worth noting that ‘war and patriotism’, a theme directly linked to 
this paper’s theoretical expectations, emerges as particularly prevalent in the corpus, covering 
19.39% of ECUs.  
 
Having identified the themes, an analysis of how the various speech types in the corpus 
differed was performed, with Figure 1 and Table 5 showing the results. 
 
Figure 1:  Individual Theme by Speech Type 
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Table 5:  Individual Theme by Speech Type 
 
 
DL FA NY VD 
Law and 
government 21.78% 20.46% 0% 0.89% 
Foreign 
policy 14.7% 8.15% 3.77% 1.79% 
Economy 16.22% 18.09% 0% 0% 
War and  
patriotism 12.07% 5.46% 60.38% 86.61% 
Science and 
education 12.34% 21.76% 11.32% 0.89% 
Economic 
policies 15.17% 3.67% 3.77% 0% 
Defence 
and 
nationhood 7.72% 22.41% 20.75% 9.82% 
 
As expected from the category descriptions in Section II.I, VD proved to be almost 
exclusively dominated by ‘war and patriotism.’ FA and DL, meanwhile, were the most 
balanced categories, which was expected due to their objectives of holistically covering the 
issues facing Russia. In this sense, Figure 1/Table 5 serve as a ‘sanity check’ of the T-Lab 
analysis. However, these results offer interesting insights of their own: NY is, similarly to 
VD, also dominated by ‘war and patriotism.’ Whilst this link between a military parade 
speech and a non-militaristic New Year’s greeting is jarring at first and possibly exposes a 
pitfall of computer-generated partitions, it may suggest that these addresses, through sharing 
a thematic dimension, serve a similar identity-building (r-raising) purpose.  
 
III.II. Dynamic Analysis 
The next step of the quantitative analysis was to see how these themes varied over time, 
shown in Figure 2 and Table 6. When considering these results, it should be noted that FA 
was the only speech category present in 2018, as Putin and his press team opted to move it 
forward from its regular December 2017 date to March 2018— just weeks before the 
Presidential election. Hence, the sharp shifts occurring between 2017 and 2018 represent the 
thematic focus of just one speech, albeit a particularly important one given its pre-electoral 
role. 
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Table 6:  Individual Theme Weighting by Year 
 
Categor
y 
Law and 
governmen
t 
Foreign 
policy 
Economy War and 
patriotism 
Science 
and 
educatio
n 
Economi
c policies 
Defence 
and 
nationhoo
d 
2012 20.48% 9.24% 12.85% 13.25% 20.48% 4.42% 19.28% 
2013 25.98% 8.1% 14.94% 12.85% 17.6% 9.5% 11.03% 
2014 17.45% 21.95% 10.88% 12.76% 12.01% 9.76% 15.2% 
2015 20.5% 12.77% 19.42% 15.83% 10.07% 13.13% 8.27% 
2016 23.08% 11.89% 18.53% 9.79% 15.03% 11.71% 9.97% 
2017 18.09% 10.55% 15.58% 17.59% 16.58% 14.07% 7.54% 
2018 6.96% 1.83% 21.25% 6.96% 21.98% 3.3% 37.3% 
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Figure 2:  Individual Theme Weighting by Year 
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The first thing to look for is evidence of sharp changes between 2013 and 2014—the year 
Putin’s popularity spiked as seen in Figure 3 below. Table 6 provides evidence that ‘foreign 
policy’, rose from 8.1% in 2013 to 21.95% in 2014, albeit gradually falling back to 10.55% 
by 2017. The other noteworthy rise from 2013 to 2014 is in ‘defence and nationhood’, which 
went from 11.03% to 15.2%, subsequently falling below its initial levels.  The fact that both 
these factors rose sharply in the exact year that experienced a popularity spike before 
diminishing, suggests that they may play a role in affecting change in popularity—as these 
themes rose so did popularity, and as they reverted popularity stabilised at the new higher 
level. Putin could be seen to have used them to ‘prove’ his credentials as a champion of 
Russian interests, without needing to do so again until 2018. It is noteworthy that in 2018, the 
electoral year in which Putin recorded his largest-ever victory with 77% of the vote, he chose 
to sharply increase his focus on one of these two themes. ‘Defence and nationhood’ 
demonstrated a 30% rise, with Putin spending 40 minutes of the 2-hour FA2018 address 
showcasing Russia’s defence programme. 
 
Figure 3:  Vladimir Putin’s Approval Ratings 
DataSource: Levada Centre, https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/  accessed 24/04/2018 
 
As with any other statistical inference, association does not imply causation: the 2014 spike 
in popularity may have been caused by any number of factors other than 
confrontational/nationalist rhetoric, including more successful policies and an improving 
economy. However, it has already been noted that 2014 was a year when the economy 
suffered particularly heavy blows, and there were no major policy shifts apart from the 
Kremlin’s response to the Maidan Revolution in Ukraine and the Central Bank’s decision to 
let the rouble float with painful inflationary repercussions (which Putin implicitly supported 
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in FA2014). Putin’s response to Ukraine through annexing Crimea is likely to have played a 
major role in raising ratings; for this move to be linked to Putin, however, communication 
becomes important. Finally, Levada’s sampling methodology, which ensures that each adult 
citizen in Russia has equal chances of being polled, makes the possibility that the spike was 
caused by a systematic change in the survey respondents unlikely, especially since the ratings 
stabilised rather than reverting (as they would have had in the event of a one-off sampling 
issue). Thus, the link between rhetorical content and popularity gains credence.  
  
III.III. Themes as ‘rB’-raising Discourses 
Building on the above analysis, this section briefly contextualises each theme as discourses 
that build identity and/or appeal to people’s individual and collective interests.  
 
Law and Government 
Levada Centre (2018) reports around 80% citizens feeling that corruption has either fully or 
significantly penetrated the Russian authorities. Addressing this is a large part of Putin’s 
discourse on law. In DL2013, Putin suggests that ‘if we get information that there is reason to 
suspect a state official, even of the highest rank, in breaking the law, it is instantly forwarded 
to law enforcement agencies for investigation.’ Later, Putin voices a citizen’s suggestion of 
executing ‘at least 350 major crooks’ to let ‘officials at various levels of government know 
what the public mood is like.’ In DL2017, Putin directly asks the governor of Stavropol to 
answer about the whereabouts of federal funding for families affected by flooding. Through 
both remarks, Putin disassociates himself from the corruption that has become too 
widespread to ignore—in FA2012 he cites ‘poor government efficiency and corruption are 
major problems that everyone can see’—thereby positioning himself as an ally of the people 
against a corrupt gubernatorial class.  
 
The fact that Putin acts on such stances in practice lends them credibility: in 2017 alone, 
Putin fired 15 governors, in what some analysts portray as a pre-electoral move (Zubarevich, 
2017).  Whatever the true motivations, through rhetorically portraying regional officials as 
the people’s enemy and subsequently confronting them, Putin is acting in accordance to 
NPL’s prescription of championing in-group interests. 
 
Not all the rhetoric on law can be directly linked to popularity, however. Much of it is 
clarifying the legislative processes behind other issues, and as such does not have its own 
Hamiltonian potency. 
Foreign Policy 
Putin’s recent popularity upsurge has often been linked to the taking of Crimea and the re-
establishment of Russia as a great geopolitical power in the eyes of its citizens (Lloyd, 2018). 
His rhetoric contains much evidence along these lines and seeks to champion Russia as a 
major player in the international arena. In DL 2014, he speaks of Russia ‘having the right to 
express our opinion’ over Ukraine. In FA2018, Putin addresses the issue of Russia’s 
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international voice directly when, presenting the Kinzhal nuclear warhead as a response to the 
‘the threats posed by the US global missile defence system’, he says about NATO members 
to a standing ovation: ‘nobody really wanted to talk to us…and nobody wanted to listen to us 
(in 2004). So listen now.’ 
 
Whilst standing firm against Western powers, Putin nevertheless seeks to position Russia as a 
global power. In FA2016, Putin speaks of the importance of ‘equal and mutually beneficial’ 
relations with the US because of the two nations’ ‘shared responsibility to ensure 
international security and stability.’ In FA2018, Putin says Russia ‘protects our interests and 
respects the interests of other countries…we observe international law and believe in the 
inviolable central role of the UN.’ In doing so, Putin counter-acts claims that Russia is an 
aggressor-state, portraying his leadership as fair and firm in the international stage, and 
communicates to his audience that they remain part of a community that is as important in the 
world as the USSR was in its heyday, and deserving to be a global power on its own terms. It 
is this ‘global-shaper role’ Putin takes on when spearheading the ‘globally competitive 
integration group’ (FA2018) that is the Eurasian Economic Union—a Central Asia-centred 
common market alternative to the EU based on ‘equality and mutual respect’ (FA2014). 
 
In talking about Ukraine and Crimea, Putin emphasises Russia’s role in supporting ‘brotherly 
republics of the former Soviet Union’ (FA2014), citing the $25 billion investment in Ukraine. 
He talks about how ‘closely related’ Russia has always been to Ukraine (DL2014) and the 
biological ‘ethnic’ bonds between Russia and Crimea as justifications for Russia’s 
involvement. Putin thereby legitimises foreign policy endeavours by the quasi-biological 
relatedness Russia shares with its neighbours, in a rhetorical move that has direct rB 
implications. 
 
That said, this discourse gains most of its Hamiltonian potency when linked to ‘defence and 
nationhood’, discussed below. 
Economy 
Much of Putin’s support since 2000 stemmed from him being seen as a prudent economic 
manager (Colton and Hale, 2009). The economy still features strongly in Putin’s rhetoric and 
becomes more prevalent in times of economic hardship—it rose from 10.88% in 2014 to 
19.42% in 2015, when post-Crimea sanctions, the oil crash, and rate tightening combined to 
cripple growth (Figure 2).  
 
Putin tends to take a realistic view of hardship, pointing out problems when these occur, as in 
his discussion of drastic home energy prices in DL2016, where he cited specific price-rises 
across gas, heating, and electricity.  
 
Putin fills his discussions on any economic issue with specific figures. His tendency to 
identify and enumerate problems portrays him as a leader aware of the issues his followers 
face, and competent enough to deal with them—an effect strengthened by him rarely 
consulting his notes even when, as in the DL conferences, the issues he discusses are both 
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technical and range across many policy areas. As such, his economic discourse directly paints 
him as someone able to raise B. 
War and Patriotism 
This discourse is perhaps most directly linked to identity creation. Putin centres much of it 
around the Great Patriotic War and creates bonds among his listeners by saying that ‘across 
our huge country…no family was spared by the war.’ He calls the USSR’s victory over Nazi 
Germany ‘great’, singling out the Russian/Soviet nation as ‘the nation that routed Nazism’ 
(VD2013). He ties Russia’s current mission to this victory when he speaks of Russia’s 
responsibility to give future generations ‘stability and peace on the planet’ and ‘pass onto 
them the grave heroic truth and memory of the Great Patriotic War’ (VD2017). 
 
In doing so, he links this discourse to that on foreign policy and defence and infuses Russian 
identity with pride through painting it as the force that saved ‘humanity from Nazism’ 
(VD2014). This link becomes clear when Putin calls the victory ‘a symbol of the sacred 
relationship between Russia and its people…it is in this unity and loyalty to the Fatherland 
that our strength, confidence and dignity lie.’ 
 
Such r-raising patriotism permeates even the seemingly apolitical NY addresses, which 
attests to their central role: 
 
‘our personal plans are inseparable from Russia, from our heartfelt, noble feelings 
toward our Fatherland. Its development and further advancement of its thousand-year-
long history is fully dependent on our joint efforts and energy, our unity and 
responsibility, our aspiration to do as much good as possible’ (NY2012). 
 
In NY addresses, Putin speaks to almost every family in Russia as they gather at home to 
celebrate the New Year—the thematic prevalence of patriotism in such an intimate setting 
attests to its centrality in Putin’s communicative strategy. 
Science and Education 
Putin’s science and education discourse focuses on state effort to develop the nation’s 
scientific prowess, aiming to increase productivity, improve healthcare provision, enhance 
military capabilities, and give citizens modern, attractive opportunities.  
 
FA2013 refers to the creation of ‘a network of centres capable of providing medical 
assistance at the most advance level’, whilst FA2015 talks about ‘the need for our own 
technology for the production, storage and processing of agricultural produce.’ The 2013 
appeal to medicine harbours back to citizens’ concern over public healthcare, whilst the 2015 
emphasis on agriculture comes at a time when the Kremlin embarked on a policy of import-
substitution, as imported goods became increasingly expensive in rouble terms due to the 
currency’s depreciation. By tying science in to pertinent problems faced by citizens, this 
discourse raises perceived B. 
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Putin’s scientific discourse has an added identity-building dimension. The rhetoric is often 
framed in competitive terms, in a possible effort to create a sense of national pride and 
aspiration.  FA2018 refers to the ‘need to take our research to a new level’ for Russia to 
‘become one of the world’s leading countries in terms of the capability and performance of 
its research infrastructure.’  In a sense, such rhetoric harbours back to Soviet-era ideological 
discourses of science being a beacon of socialist success (Josephson, 1992). Indeed, the view 
of the USSR as a scientific nation became enshrined in the minds of older generations, and 
Putin’s rhetoric may strive to create a sense of continuity with past achievements, thereby 
appealing to r. DL2016 directly corroborates this interpretation, as Putin talks about how 
Soviet-era research centres are used by ‘young and promising creative research teams 
working in breakthrough areas of modern science.’ 
 
Finally, the emphasis on the young, whilst creating a sense of dynamism associated with 
Putin’s agenda, also appeals to concerns over citizens’ perceived prospects in Russia. In 
FA2018, Putin promises to ‘support talented teachers’ by ‘building an open and modern 
system’ and proposes ‘creating the most convenient and attractive conditions for talented 
young people from other countries.’ Thus, Russia would not just be a good place to live and 
work—to attract foreign talent, it would need to be among the best globally. The overarching 
aim is to ‘turn our young people’s education drive into a powerful force for our country’s 
development’ (FA2013). Thus, the push towards science and education appeals both to 
interest (B) and creates common goals (rB). 
Economic Policies 
This is a broad theme encompassing Putin’s strategy for improving people’s lives. One 
important dimension are demographics, Russia being afflicted by sluggish population growth 
and low life expectancy. In FA2012, Putin cites the risk of Russia’s working population 
reducing by half, arguing for the need for ‘more of us’ for ‘Russia to be a strong and 
sovereign nation.’ In FA2014, Putin talks about Russia’s defiance of United Nations forecasts 
by registering a population that was 8 million more than expected and registering ‘natural 
population growth’ when the UN was forecasting shrinking. By emphasising the natural, 
Putin is creating imagery of virility in the Russian nation that refuses to be constrained by 
international forecasts. This appeal to life as a constituent of nationhood resonates with direct 
evolutionary benefit. 
 
The other distinguishing aspect of Putin’s economic policy discourse covers infrastructure 
and jobs. The issue of regional road construction propped up almost every year in this paper’s 
sample: even in FA2018, Putin spoke of the need to ‘almost double the spending on road 
construction’ and demands regional heads to ‘constantly focus attention on roads.’ Whilst 
saying that the situation is ‘completely unacceptable with local roads’, Putin notes that 
federal roads, over which the Kremlin has competencies, have been ‘overhauled.’ This is 
another instance of Putin allying himself with the people against governors over a visible 
problem. 
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Such rhetoric also achieves the ‘Eye of Sauron’ effect (Schwartzbaum, 2017), whereby 
problems are only solved when Putin directs his gaze at them. Through his 4-hour DL ‘town 
halls’, Putin conveys his concern with knowing about and resolving people’s problems. 
Characteristically, discussing the regional government not having implemented a legal 
consumer utility price-limit, Putin says he would like ‘to draw the attention of the relevant 
government agency to this fact,’ ‘and hopes this will be done shortly’ (DL2014). This grants 
him the quasi-paternal role of carer for citizens’ needs. 
 
The discourse on jobs is aspirational: in DL2013, Putin speaks about creating 25 million 
high-tech jobs to set the economy onto an ‘innovative development track’; in FA2015, Putin 
calls changing the structure of the economy and creating ‘modern jobs’ the only way to 
improve living standards, further specifying in DL2017 that a digital economy is ‘the 
number-one goal.’ The development discourse is thus linked to that on science, and positions 
Putin as a forward-looking leader, dispelling impressions that his rule is stagnating after 20 
years. 
Defence and Nationhood 
We have already seen that Putin motivates much of his foreign policy through interest 
championing amidst external wrongdoers. As the US withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty in 2000, Putin paints the US as a violator of ‘the cornerstone of the 
international security system’ (FA2018). Through portraying Russia’s defence programme as 
the result of a ‘heroic’ effort of ‘thousands of our experts’ and ‘young professionals’ to 
protect the country by developing ‘cutting-edge’ technology that ‘no other country has 
developed’, Putin portrays the effort he champions as a nation-wide achievement. 
  
Thus, military capabilities do more than B-raising protection—they also help mould identity 
through empowering Russia to have a global stewardship role. In FA2014, Putin promises to 
‘protect the diversity of the world’ and ‘actively promote business and humanitarian 
relations’ even as some countries ‘attempt to create a new iron curtain.’ Far from merely 
being a protector of global stability, ‘the wealth of Russian culture’ makes Russia ‘among the 
nations that not only create their own cultural agenda, but also influence the entire global 
civilisation.’ (FA2012). 
 
It is unsurprising Putin focused his latest electoral efforts around this discourse. Military 
security becomes a pre-requisite for the achievement of all other policy goals, suggesting that 
achievement in this domain may lead citizens to forgive lags in the economic/developmental 
domain; being ahead in the arms race, meanwhile, establishes Russia as a true global power, 
thereby creating a resilient identity based on pride that outshines the socio-economic costs of 
living in Putin’s Russia. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
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On 7 May 2000, his inaugural day as Russian President, Vladimir Putin informed citizens of 
his ‘sacred duty to unify the people of Russia, to rally citizens around clear aims and tasks, 
and to remember every day and every minute that we have one Motherland, one People, and 
one future.’ This paper’s analysis reveals that such identity-building and focus on practical 
issues permeates Putin’s discourse across thematic domains all the way to 2018. Diverse 
themes like science, economic development, and foreign policy are all connected by being 
framed in a discourse unifying Russians as working towards ambitious, globally significant 
goals that both improve people’s lives and make them proud. As the Internationale anthem 
inspiring the 1917 Russian Revolution suggested, ‘We have been nought, we shall be all!’  At 
the helm of this effort is Putin; in rallying behind him, citizens acknowledge that Putin can 
solve Russia’s current problems but has opted for a ‘long-term agenda that must be 
independent of election cycles and the prevailing situation’ (FA2015). 
 
This paper has argued that such discursive approaches make Putin’s rhetoric particularly 
attractive because they target the three elements of the Hamiltonian-NPL model (rB>C), 
which some scholars suggest underpin social behaviour. Identity-building creates bonds 
between citizens, making them care about more than just their personal economic wellbeing.  
Emphases on Russia’s interests champion the collective benefit of this strongly-bonded 
group.  Mentions of Russia’s long-term ambitions nationally and globally persuade followers 
that the long-run benefits of Putin’s agenda outweigh the socio-economic problems people 
have been experiencing during his tenure. 
 
The discursive trends that this paper has observed demonstrate that such interpretations have 
explanatory power: particularly evolutionarily potent discourses spike alongside popularity 
and are relied upon in electoral years. Additionally, the fact that most discourses identified 
here possess Hamiltonian potency may explain why Putin’s approval ratings have remained 
stably high, even as people’s lives become harder and broader government approval falls.  
Observing whether similar patterns occur in different historical contexts and testing this 
paper’s model using other types of data—including experimental findings and survey 
appraisals of r and B—can pave the way for viewing modern political societies as 
behaviourally connected to humanity’s evolutionary past. 
 
This paper’s analysis of Putin’s rhetoric nevertheless requires an additional explanatory link: 
talk is cheap, and what is said must nevertheless be believed. Putin has been at the helm of 
the Russian state for 18 years with many problems still being unresolved—the question of 
how he has retained a critical level of trust therefore becomes particularly important. His 
actions over Ukraine are a likely explanation, but evolutionary psychology may again offer 
insights: having led Russia over a long period spanning the early stages of Russia’s 
development as an independent state, Putin has become viewed by many as the nation’s 
father—something other leadership contenders cannot match. Trust in one’s parents may be 
particularly strong for evolutionary reasons, as it enhances the functioning of families.  When 
such emotions percolate to politics, however, the accountability implications become 
profound. 
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Appendices  
 
Appendix A: List of Analysed Speeches (English) 
 
Address 
 
Word 
Count 
Length 
(minutes) 
Date of 
Address 
Link 
 
FA2018 13,322 117 01 March 2018 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pre
sident/news/56957  
FA2016 9,685 69 01 December 2016 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pre
sident/news/53379  
FA2015 7,571 65 03 December 2015 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pre
sident/news/50864  
FA2014 8,541 73 04 December 2014 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pre
sident/news/47173  
FA2013 9,749 70 12 December 2013 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pre
sident/news/19825  
FA2012 11,278 82 12 December 2012 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pre
sident/news/17118 
VD2017 801 8 09 May 2017 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pre
sident/news/54467  
VD2016 641 9 09 May 2016 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pre
sident/news/51888  
VD2015 985 11 09 May 2015 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pre
sident/transcripts/49438  
VD2014 472 5 09 May 2014 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pre
sident/news/20989  
VD2013 450 4 09 May 2013 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pre
sident/transcripts/18092  
VD2012 420 6 09 May 2012 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pre
sident/news/15272 
DL2017 18,435 238 15 July 2017 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pre
sident/news/54790 
DL2016 18,235 220 14 April 2016 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pre
sident/news/51716 
DL2015 18,452 237 16 April 2015 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pre
sident/news/49261 
DL2014 17,670 236 17 April 2014 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pre
sident/news/20796 
DL2013 24,758 293 25 April 2013 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pre
sident/news/17976 
NY2017 407 4 31 December 2017 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pre
sident/news/56591  
NY2016 349 3 31 December 2016 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pre
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sident/news/53683  
NY2015 411 3 31 December 2015 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pre
sident/news/51128  
NY2014 395 3 31 December 2014 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pre
sident/news/47446  
NY2013 572 4 31 December 2013 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pre
sident/news/20022  
NY2012 336 3 31 December 2012 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pre
sident/news/17260  
 
Appendix B: List of Analysed Speeches (Russian) 
Address 
 
Word  
Count 
Length  
(minutes) 
Date of  
Address 
Link 
 
FA2018 11,428 117 01 March 2018 
http://kremlin.ru/events/presid
ent/news/56957/work  
FA2016 7,323 69 01 December 2016 
http://kremlin.ru/events/presid
ent/news/53379/work  
FA2015 6,107 65 03 December 2015 
http://kremlin.ru/events/presid
ent/news/50864/work  
FA2014 7,028 73 04 December 2014 
http://kremlin.ru/events/presid
ent/news/47173/work  
FA2013 7,578 70 12 December 2013 
http://kremlin.ru/events/presid
ent/news/19825/work  
FA2012 9,164 82 12 December 2012 
http://kremlin.ru/events/presid
ent/news/17118/work  
VD2017 605 8 09 May 2017 
http://kremlin.ru/events/presid
ent/news/54467/  
VD2016 500 9 09 May 2016 
http://kremlin.ru/events/presid
ent/news/51888/  
VD2015 732 11 09 May 2015 
http://kremlin.ru/events/presid
ent/transcripts/49438  
VD2014 346 5 09 May 2014 
http://kremlin.ru/events/presid
ent/news/20989  
VD2013 357 4 09 May 2013 
http://kremlin.ru/events/presid
ent/news/18089  
VD2012 467 6 09 May 2012 
http://kremlin.ru/events/presid
ent/news/15271 
DL2017 16,149 238 15 July 2017 
http://kremlin.ru/events/presid
ent/news/54790/work  
DL2016 15,367 220 14 April 2016 
http://kremlin.ru/events/presid
ent/news/51716/work  
DL2015 16,029 237 16 April 2015 http://kremlin.ru/events/presid
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ent/news/49261/work  
DL2014 16,383 236 17 April 2014 
http://kremlin.ru/events/presid
ent/news/20796/work  
DL2013 20,966 293 25 April 2013 
http://kremlin.ru/events/presid
ent/news/17976/work  
NY2017 313 4 31 December 2017 
http://kremlin.ru/events/presid
ent/news/56591  
NY2016 285 3 31 December 2016 
http://kremlin.ru/events/presid
ent/news/53683  
NY2015 320 3 31 December 2015 
http://kremlin.ru/events/presid
ent/news/51128  
NY2014 320 3 31 December 2014 
http://kremlin.ru/events/presid
ent/news/47446  
NY2013 463 4 31 December 2013 
http://kremlin.ru/events/presid
ent/news/20022  
NY2012 277 3 31 December 2012 
http://kremlin.ru/events/presid
ent/news/17260  
 
 
Appendix C: T-Lab Spatial Mapping of Clusters and Characteristic 
Lemmas (English) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix D: T-Lab Thematic Clusters (Russian) 
 
Cluster 
(weight in 
overall 
corpus. 
n = 
Thematic 
Labels 
Characteristic Words by Chi-squared Values 
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3,324) 
1 
(23.29%) 
 
Economic 
development 
Страны [country]; возможности [opportunities]; развития 
[development]; экономики [economy]; ведущие [leading]; 
производства [production]; передовые [cutting-edge]; 
комплекса [system]; нового [new]; ВУЗы [higher education]; 
промышленного [industrial]; число [number]; 
принципиально [principal]; таких [such]; промышленности 
[industry]; сармат [sarmat (missile)]; отраслей [fields]; 
высокотехнологичных [high-tech] 
2 
(15.19%) 
Economy Миллиардов [billions]; рублей [roubles]; процента [percent]; 
долларов [dollar]; по-моему [in my opinion]; поддержки 
[support]; чем [than]; бюджета [budget]; миллиарда [billion]; 
капитал [capital; где-то [somewhere]; рост [growth]; 
федерального [federal]; цен [price]; плюс [plus]; й []; 
предусмотрено [provided for]; триллиона [trillion]; 
инфляция [inflation]; деньги [money] 
3 
(13.55%) 
Labour and 
industry 
Федерации [federation]; российской [Russian]; согласен 
[agree]; работы [work]; повторяю [repeat]; скажем [say]; 
решение [decision]; заработной [pay]; решения [decision]; 
деятельности [activity]; хозяйства [livelihood]; работа 
[work]; считаю [consider]; честно [fair]; достаточно 
[sufficient]; сельского [agriculture]; другую [other]; людям 
[people]; платы [pay] 
4 
(10.44%) 
War and 
defence 
Сил [power]; победы [victory]; великой [great]; стран 
[countries]; точки [point]; отечественной [patriotic]; зрения 
[opinion]; стратегического [strategic]; днем [day]; 
вооруженных [armed]; х [h] ; главным [main]; работать 
[work]; рождаемости [birth rate]; самых [most]; поздравляю 
[congratulate]; наших [our]; поколение [generation]; оружия 
[weapon] 
5 
(9.00%) 
Law and 
government 
Внимание [attention]; проблемы [problems]; деньги [money]; 
правительство [government]; власти [authorities]; первое 
[first]; денег [money]; сразу [immediately]; органов 
[agencies]; все-таки [nevertheless]; правоохранительных 
[judicial]; особое [particular]; федеральных [federal]; 
стороны [sides]; обратили [turned]; проблему [problem]; 
проблема [problem]; решена [solved]; где-то [somewhere] 
6 
(13.94%) 
Common 
goals and 
bonds 
России [of Russia]; наших [our]; граждане [citizens]; 
граждан [citizens’]; интересы [interests]; отношения 
[relations]; друг [friend]; добрые [good]; жизни [life]; слава 
[glory]; друга [friend]; безопасность [safety]; товарищи 
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[comrades]; поздравить [congratulate]; новый [new]; 
понимание [understanding]; слова [words]; добьемся [achieve 
together] 
7 
(12.10%) 
Nationhood нашей [our]; Россия [Russia]; народа [of people]; народ 
[people]; истории [history]; нашего [our]; мир [world]; 
стране [country]; страны [country]; русский [Russian]; 
международной [international]; памятью [memory]; семье 
[family]; своим [our]; войны [war]; общество [society]; 
страной [country]; каждой [every]; общей [common] 
Sum: 
97.59% 
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